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Editorial

The seventh issue of P@x presents a set of analysis that echoes some of the research lines that the Peace Studies Group has been developing in its work. There is a common theme to these approaches: with different angles, they all look into processes of peace consolidation, mainly in post-conflict reconstruction scenarios.

Thus, in his considerations on the continued situation of disseminated violence that has been ravaging East Timor, José Manuel Pureza alludes to some of the feeblednesses of the international community's relationship with countries emerging from violent conflicts. A relationship based mainly on a standardized ideology and instruments and on the marginalisation of the most subjective dimensions of the reconstruction processes, those centred on people, their specific stories, conditions and expectations.

Marco Rosa analyses the intensification of the cooperation dynamics between the armed forces at the international scale and the potential of this internationalisation to the reinforcement of the United Nations' conflict resolution framework, namely through its contribution to the multinational peace forces.

Finally, the political dimension of the so-called peace building has been prompting quite diverging perspectives. In this respect, the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is an emblematic one: with the same size of Western Europe and fabulous natural resources, stage to a terribly violent armed conflict for decades and target of successive predatory strategies by corrupt networks of elites with foreign business and political powers, the DRC calls for a determination of democratic practice from the international community (in this case, the donors), starting with the holding of elections. Duncan Woodside enunciates the immense serious and immediate challenges that democracy faces in this country. And, in the DRC as in other contexts, it is the international community that faces a demand of caution that properly considers lessons from the past.

Peace consolidation is a field still loaded with ambiguities. To be aware of the mistakes made and to be able to formulate a critical judgement about them is the beginning of the right path.

Mónica Rafael
Peace Studies Group

P@X

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Special thanks to José Miguel Cardoso de Almeida

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WHAT FAILED IN EAST TIMOR?

The persistence of a dramatic situation of disseminated violence in East Timor challenges the community of peace studies.

East Timor has been often presented as a test to the validity of the dominant model of post-war reconstruction policies. Rehearsed throughout the nineties, this model was largely inspired in the agenda developed by peace studies. The centrality of positive peace and of the eradication of structural (and not merely direct) violence on the one hand, and the concern for the preventive dimension of peacebuilding processes on the other, constitute the two main references inherited from the peace studies and that, since Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, have guided the new generation of United Nations peace missions.

However, those references have been profoundly altered by the concrete experiences of peace (re)building in the past decade. The insertion of those countries in the global market and the rapid assimilation of democratic procedures became the real priorities of the international system for them. And that made all the difference. Because the model theoretically comprised of four dimensions - the economic, the political, the military/security and the psychosocial - has in fact been replaced by an almost exclusivity of the first two, in a reduced and standardised version.

What the last months of profound disturbance in East Timor reveal are two most serious weaknesses that result from that trajectory.

First, that if the present events led some to admit that we are facing a

failed state, it was the international community that ultimately failed. East Timor is a paradigmatic example of an internationalised governance State, that is, a state whose essential tasks - guarantee of security, infrastructures, basic public services - are controlled or even directly exercised by international agencies. That is the most radical expression of the submission of 'countries in transition' to a pattern of good governance materialised in a huge set of demands from the international community. Donors invoke this as one condition to build a lasting peace. But the results are the opposite: societies emptied of horizons and increasingly polarised.

Second, that the exercise of complete social, institutional and economic engineering has after all neglected what is truly essential. Some studies have stressed that employment and security should be the real priorities for processes to build a lasting peace. However, in the eagerness to build "market democracies", the formatting of legislations, institutions and administrations is given full priority - this is the purpose of the 'capacity building' and 'institutional building' recipes. And somewhere along the way stays the attention due to the reconstruction of the former combatants' life perspectives, to control the dissemination of small arms or, last but not the least, to a patient and delicate reconciliation work.

These are among the many challenges that the current turbulence in East Timor raises to a renovation of the peace studies research agenda.

José Manuel Pureza - Peace Studies Group

Peace builders

2006 NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006
(http://nobelpeaceprize.org/eng_lau_announce2006.html)

Muhammad Yunus, “What is Microcredit?”, August 2006
(<http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/WhatisMicrocredit.htm>)

Grameen Dialogue, Newsletter published by The Grameen Trust, Bangladesh,
Issue 63, April 2006
(<http://www.grameen-info.org/dialogue/index.html>)

UNPF/Microcredit Summit Campaign, “From Microfinance to Macro Change:
Integrating Health Education and Microfinance to Empower Women and
Reduce Poverty”, 2006
(http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib_pub_file/530_filename_advocacy.pdf)

Paula Duarte Lopes, “Microcrédito: uma estratégia para a paz”, *OEC Notícias*
Newsletter, nº 3, November 2006
(http://www.oec.fe.uc.pt/pdf/newsletter_3_novembro.pdf)

Sam Daley-Harris, “State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2005”,
The Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2005
(<http://www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2005/SOCR05.pdf>)

Peace Studies

In the last 15 years we have witnessed the intensification of a co-operative interaction process in the military, deemed by some authors as the internationalization of the Armed Forces (AF).[i] This phenomenon, which amongst various examples involves the contribution to multi-national peace-keeping forces, the realization of combined military exercises between the AF of various countries, or the constitution of non-permanent multi-national military forces (v.g. EUROMARFOR e EUROFOR), seems to reunite consensus in political and academic circles alike. One of the arguments in favour of this dynamic defends that the deepening of military collaboration between partners is indispensable given the existence of threats to Peace with transnational consequences. We could suppose that, in order to overcome the resulting difficulties, the internationalization of the AF at the regional level would facilitate the participation and operability of military forces in peace missions under the direction of the United Nations Organization (UN). However, this eventual contribution to the efficiency of the UN missions and, ultimately, to World Peace, raises some questions that should be treated properly and that, for that same reason, depend always on the voluntary action of States.

The aim of this article is to identify the scope of the contributions of the internationalization of the AF (with a strong regional undertone) to reinforce the framework of conflict resolution in the United Nations.

Origin

We can identify three principal intertwined impulses that stimulated the development of the internationalization of the Armed Forces. Firstly, the affirmation of the illegal nature of the use of violence in international relations, consecrated in the United Nations Charter (UNC), made the unilateral use of force, although possible, a remote possibility. Secondly, and related to the first question, the growing role of the UN in conflict resolution, especially in what deals with the military component of peace missions and the difficulties resulting from their organization, opened a space for permanent co-operation between the military forces of various countries. Lastly, the knowledge that the effects of today's conflicts do not respect borders has served as a justification for the search of collective responses through international collaboration, especially at the regional level. The example of the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the ex-Yugoslavia as a result of the conflict in Kosovo is a good example of what was previously stated.

As such, the reduction of the traditional threats to territorial integrity, the UN's requests and a new perception of international (in)security stimulated international co-operation between the AF, as well as a new orientation for the completion of international missions.

Regional Military Cooperation and Peace Missions

Marco Rosa

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Definition

The internationalization of the AF consists of the cooperative interaction at the military level that goes far beyond the involvement in international missions. This can adopt an institutional or non-institutional character, if for example it is developed in the framework of an international institution or nor. We can identify a myriad of examples in the process of the AF's internationalization: participation in international missions, constitution of permanent military forces (Standing NATO Maritime Group 1) or non-permanent ones (EUROFOR), the realization of joint exercises, the realization of training actions, the handing over of material, official meetings between military leaders, international conferences with the participation of military from various States, co-operation at the military industry level, etc. In reality, this type of co-operation usually results in the fact that the AF of various States, especially the European states, are moulded, essentially, for international missions and only make sense through the involvement in a specific regional framework of security and defence (for example, the European Policy for Defence and Security - EPDS or NATO).

Consequences

For obvious reasons, this process has gained a much greater impulse at the regional level. Factors such as geographic proximity or the fact that there are already frameworks of co-operation implemented in the military domain (v.g. NATO) as in the economic and political domains (v.g. EU or ASEAN) in a certain region of the globe create the necessary conditions for the collaboration between the AF of that geographic zone to win a completely new dynamics (v.g. EPDS or ASEAN Regional Forum - ARF).

At first glance, considering the fact that the UNC predicts the constitution of regional frameworks for the maintenance of peace and security, and in what concerns the difficulties related to the preparation and operationality of the military component of a peace mission, the internationalization of the AF at the regional level seems to bring great advantages:

- The strong co-operative interaction in a given region allows for the creation of common languages, doctrines and procedures that are very useful when the AF of these countries act jointly in a given theatre of operations;
- The military participation in a peace mission imposes a level of demand that is very high in financial and operational terms, in means, in personnel and in command. The eventual weaknesses that might affect an isolated State can be compensated by the previous adaptation of the capacities of the various regional partners, through a pre-established co-operation model;

Regional Military Cooperation and Peace Missions

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A decision from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in favour of a military intervention demands urgency in the respective intervention. The fact that there already exist regional military structures increases the necessary readiness for the constitution of an international force.

However, the suppression of these obstacles might lose its significance if the regional structures with military capability to support autonomously a peace mission fall prey to the temptations of *Realpolitik* or, in other words, if they use their means to impose their own agenda in international security terms. In 1999, the intervention of NATO in Kosovo, without the previous authorization of the UNSC, instead of re-enforcing, questioned the legitimacy and the jurisdiction of the structure of conflict resolution in the UNC. Even though imperfect, this is the international framework recognized by the majority of nations to decide over War and Peace. As such, the development of security structures at the regional level, and their military capabilities through the co-operation of the AF, will have to be structured by statutes that make clear reference to the sub-alternate role they must take to the decisions of the UNSC and the UNC. This is a pertinent and current question, if we take into account the development of the EPDS in Europe [ii] and the proposals to constitute an *Asian Security Community*, in the framework of ASEAN [iii].

[i] Moskos, Charles C., Williams, John Allen, Segal, David R. (2000), *The Post-modern Military: Armed Forces After The Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

[ii] In the Strategy for European Security there is a reference to Effective Multilateralism that passes through the defense and development of International Law as a mean to re-inforce the role of the UN.

[iii] With centers for the fight against terrorism, training for peace missions and maritime vigilance and surveillance.

Regional Military Cooperation and Peace Missions

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DRC: CROSS FIRE AT THE CROSS-ROADS*

Background

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) is one of the most troubled nations in the world, bedevilled by decades of brutal and exploitative misrule, which have left society as a whole with deep scars. Nearly a half a century after gaining independence, the kleptocratic legacy left by Belgian rule is still depressingly evident. In recent years, the country plunged to new depths of despair, as an influx of Hutu refugees from Rwanda - a large minority of whom were responsible for perpetrating the 1994 genocide in this neighbouring country - created the catalyst for two civil wars in DR Congo. These two conflicts, which lasted between 1996-97 and 1998-2003, were characterised by neighbouring Rwanda's post genocide regime invading DR Congo to hunt down genocide perpetrators, although many other countries also got involved, amid a scramble to exploit the country's vast natural resources. According to the International Rescue Committee (a US-based non governmental organisation), up to four million have died in DR Congo in the last five years, mainly from war-related hunger and disease. A transition government has been in place since June 2003, which has held a tentative grip on power, ahead of democratic elections. These elections, presided over by a UN force (called by its French acronym, MONUC, and totalling around 18,000 troops) together with a very short term EU force, are the most expensive ever organised by the UN. The total cost of the polls is estimated at US\$450 million, as the international community attempts to establish a durable and legitimate governing structure that will finally allow this vast country to reverse decades of decline.

The elections

The elections had been due to take place by an initial deadline of 30 June 2006, but ongoing insecurity meant successive postponements, to a date of 30 July 2006. Polling passed off remarkably smoothly as people queued patiently from dawn on July 30 to cast their votes, creating cautious optimism that an enduring peace may finally be around the corner. Even the capital, Kinshasa, where there had been rioting in the days leading up to the poll, was characterised by an encouraging calm on the day itself.

However, subsequent events have cast fresh doubt on whether the key elements of DR Congo's political class have the maturity and mutual respect necessary for nurturing an even vaguely durable democratic structure. With incumbent President Joseph Kabila failing to secure the 50% necessary for outright victory in the first round, it became clear three weeks after the poll that a second round run-off against the second most popular candidate (Jean Pierre Bemba, one of four vice-Presidents) would be necessary. Raising tensions, a television station belonging to Bemba announced that a run off would be needed before the results had officially been confirmed. This led to fighting at the station between Bemba's personal guard and elements loyal to Kabila, including police units and the presidential guard. The fighting then spread further, with the presidential guard attacking Bemba's two residences and his office, trapping 14 ambassadors and the head of MONUC under heavy fire for several hours.

In order to reverse this re-escalation of violence, the international community has had to exert significant pressure. It is only due to such pressure that the country was in a position to stage the second round run-off (this second poll took place on 29 October, amid the same kind of overall calm that characterised the first round). An important initial step was taken in forcing the two protagonists to appear on the national television station and call on their troops to cease fighting. Subsequently, Bemba and Kabila signed an agreement which pledged them to demilitarise Kinshasa and stop hate speech via their media outlets, but this agreement left a number of issues unaddressed, including who will be allowed to carry guns and how many private guards should be permitted for each of the candidates. There is a major power imbalance between the two candidates: Kabila's presidential guard numbers around 14,000 throughout the country, with over a third of these forces based in Kinshasa. Whilst Bemba has quite a sizeable personal guard of around 600-800 in Kinshasa this is clearly well below the resources of the President, although there are reports that he has been seeking to enlist the support of disaffected elements. Lately, there have been reports that both the presidential guard and Bemba's private army have received fresh supplies, indicating preparation by both sides for a fresh confrontation. It appears likely that Kabila will triumph in the second round of

DRC: CROSS FIRE AT THE CROSS-ROADS

voting, although the outcome is perhaps less clear-cut than it appeared during the count for the first round (he received 45% of the vote, compared to 20% for Bemba). Although Kabila has enlisted the support of a number of candidates who finished below second place in the first round, many of these candidates' own supporters harbour a deep mistrust of him, feeling that he has been too prepared to compromise with foreign interests. Additionally, he received only 13% of the vote in Kinshasa during the first round, and his low popularity in the west of the country (most of his support came from the east) has waned further in the last couple of months, largely due to a perception that his forces were primarily to blame for the violence surrounding the first round of voting.

Future Scenarios

The weeks surrounding the announcement of the result of the second round run-off (expected on November 19) clearly pose significant risks for DR Congo's immediate stability, despite the presence of the UN force and the EU force. Kinshasa is the most dangerous flashpoint, given the high level of urbanisation, the presence of the seat of government and large numbers of heavily armed rival troops. The main residences of Kabila and Bemba are within a kilometre or so of one another, with rival troops stationed only a few hundred yards from each other; this is a situation with all the ingredients for a Mexican stand off. If the result of the second round were to be disputed, it is clear that the combined force of just over 3,000 UN and EU troops in the capital would be in severe danger of being over-stretched. The danger of this is exacerbated by the fact that the EU force's mandate ends at the beginning of December, amid little prospect of any extension to its proposed stay (there is significant opposition in Germany, one of the main contributors of troops to the UN mission, to a more long-term mission). If EU troops start disappearing amid heavy fighting between the rival factions, this would send a very negative message to the protagonists, as it would indicate a weak will on the part of the international community, leaving the UN troops exposed.

Even if the announcement of the result passes off smoothly, there are still significant other issues to be resolved, beyond the short to medium term. There are sizeable elements which have remained outside the country's original peace process and/or subsequent transition toward democracy. One of these groups is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a force of 8-10,000, which continues to base itself in the forests of eastern Congo and still contains genocidal exiles from Rwanda. Indeed, their presence remains, despite Rwanda's earlier invasions. Rwanda retains significant interests in DR Congo, in terms of the mineral resources it exploited during the two civil wars, and the presence of the FDLR could be used as a pretext for future cross border incursions into Congolese territory. Another group which has not been reconciled within Congo's peace process is a force of several thousand men under the command of a dissident General called Laurent Nkunda, a renegade who has historically had strong links with the current Rwandan regime. Nkunda, like Rwanda, has used the presence of the FDLR as cover to threaten aggression, and he led a rebellion which temporarily captured Bukavu, an important town in the east, late in the first half of 2004.

There are also other elements that could significantly disrupt any legitimate post election government that emerges in DR Congo. Over 30 people stood for election in the first round, the vast majority of whom will have been disappointed by the outcome. Many of these candidates can call on significant armed factions, in a country which remains bedevilled by a plethora of arms and a lack of any disciplined or coherent exertion of authority. In the end, the danger persists that the international community's huge effort in staging these elections - and the massive peacekeeping efforts that preceded the polls - will not prove fruitful. Indeed, quite apart from the profusion of weapons, a pervading (but understandable) mistrust of authority, lack of infrastructure and endemic corruption, it may well be that this country, which is the size of Western Europe, is just too unwieldy and fundamentally diverse to ever realistically be capable of marking itself out as a viable nation state. In that context, a massive (and even enhanced) UN presence will likely be required for several years to come, ahead of possible eventual secession by key provinces.

Duncan Woodside, Journalist

* Article written before the announcement of the second round results

PEACE STUDIES GROUP (NEP) AGENDA

Publications

Freire, Maria Raquel; Cravo Teresa Almeida, "La Politique Étrangère du Portugal: Européanisme, Atlantisme, ou les Deux? ", *La Revue Internationale et Stratégique*, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), n.62, été 2006, pp. 22-28.

Pureza, José Manuel *et al*, "The intercultural dimension of citizenship education in Portugal", in Alred, G. *et al* (eds.) (2006), *Education for intercultural citizenship. Concepts and comparisons*. Cleveland, Buffalo, Toronto: Multilingual Matters Ltd.

Sogge, David, "[Angola: e onde está a 'boa governação' do mundo?](#)", Working Paper 23, FRIDE/NEP, Madrid/Coimbra, Junho 2006.

Book Review

Freire, Maria Raquel, Secção "Rússia", *Relações Internacionais*, n.9, 2006, 196-200.

NEP's Activities

2-4 July 2006

Raquel Freire presented the paper "[Looking East: The EU and the Caucasus](#)", CISS ISA VI Millennium Series Conference "The Global Imperative: Responding to Change in the International System", The Hague.

13 July 2006

Sílvia Roque presented the conference "[A montante e a jusante dos Estados falhados](#)", at the course on Economia na Cooperação e Educação para o Desenvolvimento, no quadro global das relações Norte-Sul e incluindo o comércio justo organised by CENJOR and the NGO CIC, Coimbra.

20 July 2006

José Manuel Pureza presented the conference "[A cidadania, repto à recentragem da educação em Portugal](#)", at the Audição Pública sobre "Como vamos melhorar a educação nos próximos anos?", promoted by the Conselho Nacional de Educação, Lisbon.

August 2006

José Manuel Pureza presented the conference "[What is human security - definitions and analysis](#)", Summer Academy on Human Security (European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy), Graz.

PEACE STUDIES GROUP (NEP) AGENDA

NEP's Activities

September 2006

Beginning of the project "[Women and armed violences: War strategies against women in non-war contexts](#)", a comparative study between Rio de Janeiro, Guayaquil and Medellin, coordinated by José Manuel Pureza and Tatiana Moura. Financed by the Ford Foundation.

September 2006

Mónica Rafael and Katia Cardoso coordinated, with Clara Keating, the CES newsletter, [CESemCena 6](#).

September 2006

Teresa Cravo was doing field work in Mozambique, within the project "[Peacebuilding processes and state failure strategies. Lessons learned from former Portuguese colonies](#)".

27 September 2006

Strategic planning meeting of the Peace Studies Group, Arouca.

17 October 2006

Public presentation of the study: "[Angola: e onde está a 'boa governação' do mundo?](#)" by David Sogge, organised by NEP in collaboration with the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Externo (FRIDE) and the Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (UAL).

18 October 2006

José Manuel Pureza presented the book "[Irão: o país nuclear](#)", by Ricardo Alexandre, Coimbra.

19 October 2006

Raquel Freire presented the seminar "[Transições falhadas? O caso da Ucrânia](#)", CES, Coimbra.

October 2006

Sílvia Roque began the PhD programme in [International Relations: "International Politics and Conflict Resolution"](#), Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra.

Teresa Cravo began the PhD programme in [International Studies](#), Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge

Tatiana Moura and Carla Afonso participate in the 15 month project "[Implementação do Programa de Apoio a "sobreviventes" de Chacinas no Rio de Janeiro](#)", a partnership between NEP/CES and the Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania (CESeC), Rio de Janeiro. Financed by the Ford Foundation.

20 October to 6 November 2006

Sílvia Roque was doing field work in Guinea-Bissau, within the project "[Peacebuilding processes and state failure strategies, Lessons learned from former Portuguese colonies](#)"

26 October 2006

José Manuel Pureza participated in the first debate of the cycle "[Causas e efeitos](#)", Livraria Almedina, Lisbon.

6-28 November 2006

Mónica Rafael was doing field work in Luanda and Huambo (Angola), in the context of the project "[Peacebuilding processes and state failure strategies : lessons learned from former Portuguese colonies](#)".